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Two visions on aid effectiveness and allocation are compared. The first one,
corresponding to the new aid paradigm, argues that aid is effective only if domestic
policies are good. According to a second assumption presented here the aid effectiveness
depends on the external and climatic environment: the worse this environment, or the
more vulnerable the recipients countries, the higher the aid effectiveness. Cross-sectional
econometric tests related to GDP growth on two twelve-year pooled periods clearly
favour the second assumption. However the two views can be conciliated in a principle of
performance based aid allocation, considering performance as the outcomes adjusted for
the impact of environmental factors. Performance, so defined, can be measured by several
ways which are themselves compared. Such a principle leads to allocate more aid the
worse the (external) environment (for a given policy) and the better the policy (for a
given environment).
Résumé
Cet article compare deux conceptions relatives à l'efficacité de l'aide et à son
allocation. La première, qui correspond au nouveau paradigme de l'aide, soutient que
l'aide n'est efficace que si la politique économique des pays receveurs est bonne. Selon la
seconde, présentée ici, l'efficacité de l'aide dépend de l'environnement externe et
climatique (naturel), meilleur est cet environnement (ou moins le pays est vulnérable)
moins l'aide est efficace. Les tests économétriques transversaux relatifs à des taux de
croissance empilés sur deux périodes de douze ans donnent clairement l'avantage à la
seconde hypothèse. Toutefois, les deux vues peuvent être conciliées dans le principe
d'une allocation de l'aide fondée sur les performances, à condition de définir celles-ci
comme les résultats économiques ajustés pour l'impact de l'environnement. Dans cet
esprit, plusieurs mesures de performances sont à leur tour comparées. Le principe énoncé
conduit à accorder plus d'aide si l'environnement est mauvais, pour une politique donnée,
ou/et si la politique est bonne (pour un environnement donné).45
AID AND PERFORMANCE: A REASSESSMENT
«They went never any rejected from my door »
T.S. Eliot
1 - Introduction
Aid has been assessed (World Bank 1998, Burnside and Dollar 1997). The
question raised thirteen years ago by Cassen et alii (Does Aid Work? 1986) has been
answered. It can work, depending on policies. If they are good, aid will be efficient, if they
are not, aid will be useless, at best. Aid has to be allocated to those countries pursuing good
policies, to a larger extent, it is argued, than is already the case. Aid effectiveness and aid
selectivity issues are thus simultaneously solved. Coming after thirty years of academic work
and political discussions and facing a resilient agnosticism about the effects of external aid on
development (see the survey of H. White, 1994), the new paradigm may appear reassuring.
However it raises two basic and related problems: is good policy the only conditioning factor?
Is it the single right criterion according to which aid should be allocated ? If the answer to
these questions is negative, aid needs to be reassessed, which is what we try to suggest.
In this paper we argue that aid effectiveness (also) depends on exogenous (mostly
external) environment factors (terms of trade trend and real value of exports instability,
climatic shocks, etc...): we posit that the worse the environment, the greater the need for aid
and the higher its productivity.
Thus for the rationale of aid allocation, environment matters: aid has also to be
allocated to those countries affected by a poor environment (i.e. by external shocks). This is
presently the case, but to a rather limited extent. This suggests an alternative paradigm, in
which aid compensates for negative shocks and also supports good policies. To put it another
way, aid can be viewed as an insurance as well as a reward.
Indeed the two paradigms are not exclusive. They can be combined as far as aid
effectiveness may depend both on policies and on the environment. The principle of aid6
allocation based on « performance » (and of performance conditionality) previously suggested
(Collier, Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney, Gunning 1997) is consistent with this
perspective.
The paper is organised as follows.
 We first consider (section 2) a growth cum-aid model in which growth depends
on three categories of factors: i) structural or initial factors, ii) shocks or environment factors
and iii) policy factors. Aid is added to these factors, as are two other interactive variables,
reflecting that aid's marginal contribution to growth depends positively on policies, as
expected by Burnside and Dollar, and negatively on environment, as we expect. Omitting
either environment or policy variables leads to two special models, with specific implications
which are discussed below.
The model is then estimated on a sample of developing countries on two pooled
twelve-year periods (section 3). We find that aid's contribution to growth depends
significantly on the environment, with the expected sign, but not on policy (at least with the
expected sign). We provide a tentative explanation for this finding. The model is estimated
first by OLS, then through a TSLS procedure, with aid simultaneously assumed to depend
both on the environment (shocks) and on policy. It also appears that aid is negatively related
to the quality of the external environment. In other words aid flows to countries suffering
from more severe external shocks.
Finally (section 4) we comment on the implications of our results for aid
allocation and conditionality. We argue in favour of aid being allocated according to
«performance», and define performance as the growth outcome adjusted for the total impact
of the environment (in particular, shocks), i.e. its direct impact and its impact through policy :
so defined, growth performance, compared to growth outcome, is increased both by an
unfavorable environment and by good policy. These are precisely the two kinds of factors
which are assumed to increase aid's effectiveness, but the environment does so more clearly
than policy, according to our results. Due to analytical doubts about the possibility of
adequately capturing the main components of good policy, through an index, and due to
political doubts about the effectiveness of conditionality based solely on policy instruments,
we suggest measuring «performance» without using policy variables, and consider it as a
possible indicative aid allocation criterion.7
2 – Conceptual framework: how benign is it to neglect external environment?
A brief  review of the literature : from the two-gap to a two-target approach
Aid effectiveness has been extensively studied during the past forty years. Among
others, the work of Chenery and Strout (1966) made the contribution of aid to growth
depending on one of several potentially binding constraints (successively absorptive capacity,
savings, and foreign exchange). In line with this paper the popular two-gap view (where the
gaps correspond to the savings gap and the foreign exchange gap) assumed that the effects of
aid on growth depended on the nature of the main gap or need faced by a country. Moreover
the now rather dated literature on absorptive capacity and aid, before and after the Chenery-
Strout paper, illustrated the reliance of aid effectiveness on specific factors, mainly human
resources (c.f. Millikan and Rostow 1957, Rosenstein-Rodan 1961, Adler 1965, Guillaumont
1971). (Other analyses of aid's effects through computable general equilibrium models have
also examined the factors conditioning these effects (see for instance Chenery, Lewis, de
Melo, Robinson 1986).
Paradoxically the numerous cross-sectional studies of the effects of aid on GDP
growth, with very different model specifications, have generally introduced aid simply as an
additional factor in the relationship without any interactive effect with other factors. Aid was
supposed to have the same (positive or negative) effect on the growth rate of all the countries,
after controlling for a specific set of other (additive) factors. Usually, the results were
insignificant at the usual levels of confidence (see Mosley 1987, White 1992)
1.
In recent cross-sectional investigations, Burnside and Dollar (1997) have made a
significant step forward by considering that aid's contribution to growth could depend on
some features specific to each receiving country, namely on their policy. They find that aid,
especially when they exclude middle income countries from their sample, has a significant
positive effect on growth only when policy is "good enough". But aid's contribution to growth
may also depend on factors other than policy, namely external or environment factors, an
alternative assumption which is here considered. Having put aside the two-gap model,
                                                       
1 Note that the meaning of “aid” in the aid effectiveness literature strongly differs among studies (some mainly
focused on official development assistance…, others on aggregate capital inflows…).8
because of its excessive rigidity, we can however remember its main lesson concerning the
dependence of aid's effects country-specific conditions
2.
Basic assumptions on aid effectiveness
In a neo-classical framework, as indicated by Burnside and Dollar, aid is expected
to accelerate the transition to steady state growth. This transitory contribution to growth, they
suppose, is  variable according to policy. Why ?
Two main reasons can be given. First it is well known that the ex post rate of
return of aid financed projects is higher when the macroeconomic framework is good than
when it is poor. Their return is lessened  by distortions such as a black market for foreign
exchange, import quotas, etc.., as is the return of other projects. Second, due to the possible
fungibility of public resources (c.f. evidenced by Devarajan et alii 1998, Feyzioglu et alii
1998, Pack and Pack 1993) , a good allocation of public expenditures renders the marginal
efficiency of aid financed expenditure higher. These two reasons, which do not consider aid to
be a significantly different form of financial flows, face some limitations.
First, if aid, through conditionality, is likely to lead or to allow a country to adopt
better policies, the poorer the initial policy, the larger the room for improvement: in that case
policy is endogenous to aid, a problem to be handled in the econometric model. Adjustment
lending can be all the more efficient in reforming policy that policy has to be reformed. If
policy is initially good, adjustment aid has less chance to be very efficient in leading to real
improvement.
Second the thesis of higher aid efficiency due to a better general allocation of
public funds relies on two assumptions. One is of course fungibility. Without fungibility, the
argument can be reversed: the poorer the allocation of domestic resources, the stronger the
possible improvement of the whole allocation induced by aid. But even if resources are
fungible, as they are likely to be, the quality of expenditure in a given sector or for a specific
purpose is expected to be higher when financed by aid: expenditures financed by aid for any
project normally involve, through the "aid dialogue", a transfer of knowledge on their design
and implementation, and may induce some specific reforms (indeed this is an old justification
                                                       
2 Another assumption, tested by Chauvet (1998), was that aid effectiveness depends (negatively) on socio-9
given for project aid, see for instance Hirschman 1967, de Vries 1967, Guillaumont 1975, and
an argument well taken in the World Bank 1998).
It now appears that the selectivity argument, which proposes that aid should be
allocated according to the quality of  policy, remains somewhat ambiguous. On the grounds
that policy based selectivity can accelerate growth, the argument is not perfectly clear, and
has to be empirically tested (this has already been done, and will be discussed below). If aid is
not actually  more productive when policy is better, the argument could appear only to be a
moral one, and, we can add, politically appealing: aid would be viewed as a reward for good
policies. However, in this case, aid can be presented as an incentive to adopt good policies, an
argument that is itself open to debate (Berg 1997a, 1997b).
Besides good policies, other factors can be assumed to influence aid effectiveness.
Her we assume that developing countries affected by external or climatic shocks need more
foreign support and that in these countries foreign aid is more effective, other things being
equal. The reason is that more vulnerable countries need some kind of insurance in order to
avoid the interruption or collapse of growth process (possibly leading to lasting recession). An
abundant literature has shown the negative effects on growth in developing countries of
different kinds of shocks, either durable, such as a declining trend of the terms of trade, or
transitory, such as the instability of the real value of exports or other exogenous instabilities
(climate) (cf for instance Collier and Gunning 1997, Dawe 1997, Guillaumont 1994,
Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney, Brun 1999, Ramey and Ramey 1995, Rodrick, 1998).
The point raised here is that aid is likely to make a greater marginal contribution to growth in
countries suffering from shocks. To put it another way : the negative effects of shocks are
expected to be dampened by aid. An extreme case in a growth perspective is that of
emergency aid : it is not only a humanitarian matter, it may also be a factor that  contributes to
the sustainability of growth.
We have thus two main kinds of factors likely to influence aid effectiveness, as
well as what we may call two corresponding "aid paradigms". The first is that of aid aimed at
supporting good policies, expected to reinforce their effect, or at least to reward them. The
second stresses that aid has to allow countries to overcome their vulnerability, to face shocks
in better conditions, or at least to (partially) compensate for their effects. Aid supporting
                                                                                                                                                                            
political instability.10
policies appears to be designed as an incentive, and aid facing vulnerability as a (macro)
insurance. Possible shortcomings are moralising advice in one case, moral hazard in the other
one.
A related question is to know whether aid is actually allocated according to the
quality of the policy or to that of  the environment (i.e. to vulnerability), whatever the other
factors of aid allocation are. Assuming that aid decisions are (partially) driven by the
objective of maximising the growth of recipients, the answer would depend on the preceding
question about which of  these two factors, policy or the environment, have a greater
influence on aid effectiveness. We have thus to test jointly their respective influence on aid
effectiveness and aid allocation.
Of course there may be other factors that condition aid effectiveness,
in particular those identified in the earlier literature on aid and gathered within the absorptive
capacity concept; these are mainly centered on human resources (these important factors were
once considered also as a criterion, debatable indeed, for aid allocation)
3.
The empirical model: the aid vulnerability relationship
The general model corresponding to the previous assumptions can be written as
follows, with some notation similar to that of Burnside and Dollar:
. git : the growth rate of real per capita GDP of country i during period t
. Ait : the level of aid as a fraction of GDP received by country i in period t
. Pit : a vector of macroeconomic policy variables in country i at time t
. Eit : a vector of external and climatic environment variables in country i at time t (i.e.  a
vector of vulnerability variables)
. Xit: a vector of initial conditions and other exogeneous variables such as yit the level of real
per capita GDP in country i at the beginning of period t, or hit the level of human capital per
capita in country i at the beginning of period t.
The growth equation suggested by the literature on growth determinants and the
previous discussion on aid would be
                                                       
3 See the previous references to Millikan and Rostow (1958) and Rosenstein-Rodan (1961).11
git = bo + bx Xit +  be Eit   + bp Pit  + ba Ait  + bap .  Ait .  Pit + bae . Ait  . Eit  + eigt (1)
Note that this equation simply adds the two variables, Eit and Ait  . Eit , to the initial Burnside-
Dollar model. To avoid an excessive number of interactive variables we shall use scalar
indices both for policy and for environment (vulnerability), respectively drawn from a linear
combination of policy variables and a linear combination of vulnerability variables, as
explained in more detail below, (by a way proximate to that used by Burnside and Dollar for
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Also noted by Burnside and Dollar, aid and policy may be endogenous and
“depend on the independent variables in the system and on each other”. This problem can be
solved by creating instruments for aid and policy only if appropriate instruments are found,
i.e. not correlated with the growth residual, eigt.
Consider, in that perspective, the implication of having added the Eit variables.
We suppose that both policy and aid depend on these environment (vulnerability) variables
which also influence growth and as such are not appropriate instruments for policy and aid.
Indeed one of the major expected effects of external shocks is to render sound
macroeconomic policy less likely and even to induce wrong policy choices: for instance real
value of exports instability often leads to over-investment and/or to public deficits.  It may be
also that policy choices are influenced by some initial conditions such as the level of human
capital. Finally, policy could be influenced by aid, either positively through conditionality, or
negatively if it is a substitute to public effort: the result is ambiguous and actually
insignificant in some regressions of this kind (as in Burnside-Dollar, see also Boone 1996,
World Bank 1998 for the diversity of relationships between aid and reform). So we can write:
Pit = po + peEit +  pxXit + pa Ait + eipt  (2)
This policy equation needs several comments:12
- if the policy indicator is endogenous to growth, then eipt is correlated with the growth
residual eigt.
- in order to instrument Pit  in the growth equation the vector Xit should include some
structural variables explaining policies which are not already explaining growth:
instrumentation of policies in a growth equation is a difficult task indeed
- on the other hand all the variables included in the vector Xit  of structural or initial variables
used in eq. 1 are not likely to influence policy: we find below that only human capital
(education) among  these possible explanatory variables is  significant, so we can replace in
eq. 2  the vector Xit by a single variable hit  representing the initial level of human capital
4
- leaving the variable  Ait in equation (2) is debatable because its effect is ambiguous and it
has been proven to be insignificant in previous studies (Burnside and Dollar) as it is in our
estimations (see below).
So we can rewrite equation (2) as follows:
Pit = p’o + p'eEit +  p'hhit + e’ipt  (pe > 0, ph > 0) (2')
Concerning aid, it is not totally candid to assume that its allocation between
developing countries may depend on the specific needs revealed by the environment
vulnerability variables. It also and mostly depends, as is well known, on some initial
conditions and structural variables, such as GDP per capita and the size of the population.
Finally it could be influenced by policy, as it is hoped to be, according to the new aid
paradigm.
We can write
Ait = ao + ae Eit + ax Xit + ap Pit + eiat  (ae < 0, ap > 0) (3)
Note that
- if the environment indicator is endogenous to growth, then eiat is correlated with the growth
residual eigt.
- in order to instrument aid in the growth regression, the vector Xit should include some
structural variables explaining aid which are not already explaining growth: the variables
representing the strategic position or the preferential political links with the main donors are
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good candidates for such a role (let us call Sit the vector of these variables for country i during
the period t)
- among the main variables which are included in the vector Xit (or Eit) and which explain aid
are the GDP per capita and the population size (let us call X'it and E'it the vectors Xit and Eit
without these variables and Sit)
So we can rewrite equation (3) as follows:
Ait = a’o + a’e E'it + as Sit + ax X'it +  a’p Pit + e’iat  (3')
We now have a system of three equations which have to be identified. The
inclusion of Eit variables in a system where they would be omitted is likely to eliminate biases
in the coefficients of aid's contribution to growth as far as they are correlated with growth
(positively), with aid (we assume negatively) and with policies (we assume positively). It can
be shown that, assuming no relationship between aid and policy, the omission of Eit leads one
to overrate the (presumed positive) impact of aid and/or of the interactive Aid x Policy
variable on growth. Instrumentation  of aid and policy does not eliminate biases if
vulnerability factors are used as instruments, but are not included in the growth regression.
In order to estimate our model, we shall have of course to use a two-stage least
squares procedure, the growth equation being estimated with simultaneous instrumentation of
aid and policy, but we also shall have to look for specific instruments not likely to be
correlated with growth. Their validity will be assessed through the use of tests or over-
identification.
We can make a step further towards a simpler model which allows one to  avoid
the acute problem of finding acceptable instruments for policy variables and moreover is
convenient to test the total effect of aid and vulnerability on growth. Let us combine (1) and
(2'). We obtain:
git = b’o + b’x Xit + b’e E
~
it + b’a Ait + b’ae Ait. E
~
it + b’ah Ait hit + e'igt (4)
We note that
b’e = be + bp p'e
         +    +   +
b’a = ba + bap  p’o
          +      ?     ?
b’ae = bae + bap p'e
             -       ?
Note that using eq. 2', we have assumed that Ait has no significant impact on policy (pa »0).14
We have a new interactive variable (Ait.hit) which here only results from the two combined
assumptions : human capital improves policy and policy influences aid effectiveness ; it may
be also that human capital directly improves aid effectiveness.
3 -  An econometric estimation of conditional aid effects
Any econometric estimation of aid effects requires preliminary choices to be
made regarding the measurement of aid and on the time period covered. Once these choices
have been explained, we present the nature and sources of the variables used in the model,
followed by the results of growth regressions obtained with OLS and with TSLS. Finally, we
present specific results for aid and policy regressions.
Aid measurement
ODA (Official Development Assistance), as defined and measured by the OECD,
is indeed a somewhat arbitrary concept (due to the criterion of 25%  grant element calculated
with an unchanging discount rate of 10%). Thus, the effort made by the World Bank (Chang,
Fernandez-Arias and Serven 1998) to measure «true » aid flows according to a « new
approach » is welcome. This measure, already used by Burnside and Dollar on a provisional
basis, is the sum of the grants and the grant equivalent of official loans, itself measured by
taking into account the level of interest rates in lending countries. This may be an appropriate
procedure if one wishes to evaluate the quality of the aid offered by a donor country. But it
does not seem to be a relevant measure of the potential benefit drawn by a recipient country
during a given period from the net flow actually received : the real counterpart of ODA flows
or their impact on public finance seems to be better caught by the net disbursements than by
the grant equivalent. Thus the macro-economic effects of aid can reasonably be assessed by
taking actual disbursements as the explanatory variable
5. In our regressions, the aid variable is
the ratio of net ODA disbursements to GDP, as directly calculated by the OECD
6.
                                                       
5 Of course, it would be interesting to test the sensibility of the results with the two different measures of aid and
the same model.
6 However, we made an alternative estimation with the new definition of aid as the grant element (Effective
Development Assistance, EDA) but the results of the TSLS growth regressions do not differ significantly.15
Length of the observation period
We are interested in an assessment of the effects of aid on growth over a long
period of time. We can of course cover a long period by simply stacking observations on a
number of shorter periods (Burnside and Dollar take six four year periods). But to test the
assumptions presented above, we need a balance between two considerations. When the focus
is on policy, it is convenient to limit the length of the period, due to possible changes in
policies. Vulnerability on the other hand, may be measurable only over a longer period, and
may be its effects on growth. The aid effects themselves, as they are related to institutions,
infrastructure, human capital and even structural policy may be delayed over a number of
years. This may be the case even when the aid aims to support imports, since it can avoid
collapses that have lasting effects.
In order to keep a balance between a shorter period likely to capture the
reversibility of policy stances, and a longer period appropriate to the meaning of the concept
of vulnerability, and to some lagged effects of aid, we have chosen to analyse the (growth)
effects of aid over two pooled twelve-year periods (1970-1981 and 1982-1993), thus allowing
us to cover  twenty-four years.
Definition of the variables and base specification of the growth regression
Following the traditional economic growth literature, we have introduced a first
set of structural exogenous factors (corresponding to the Xit vector of equation (1)) to explain
the growth of real per capita GDP : the initial per capita GDP (source Summers and Heston,
1993) to capture convergence effects, the average years of secondary schooling over age 25 at
the beginning of the period (hit) (source Barro and Lee, 1996), the rate of population growth,
financial depth, measured by the ratio of M2 to GDP (source WDI), as a proxy for the initial
distortions in the financial system, a measure of previous political instability (a weighted sum
of the number of revolutions per year and of the number of assassinations per million
inhabitants per year) (source Barro and Lee, 1993). The last two variables are lagged one
period to avoid simultaneity problems. We also added the ethnolinguistic fragmentation index
often used in the recent literature (Mauro, 1995, Easterly and Levine, 1997, Arcand,
Guillaumont and Guillaumont-Jeanneney, 1999).
7
                                                       
7 We have also introduced the squared value of this variable according to the assumption of polarisation (Arcand,
Guillaumont and Guillaumont-Jeanneney, 1999) but it was then deleted because it was not significant.16
A second set of exogenous variables corresponds to the vector Eij of the model,
the "environment variables" aimed at capturing the exogenous vulnerability of a country.
Instead of working with a "bad environment" indicator we use a "good environment" indicator
to compare easily the result with the "good policy" hypothesis. To construct this indicator, we
use four variables previously normalised on a scale from 0 to 100. They are weighted by their
impact on growth, as it appears in regression (1-1) in Table 1.
The structural vulnerability of a country is assumed to result from the size of the
shocks it faces and from its exposure of these shocks (Guillaumont, 1998).There are several
kinds of possible shocks (a similar presentation of the indicator of these shocks is given in
Guillaumont, Guillaumont-Jeanenney, Brun, 1999). One of them is the climatic shock. There
are many different climatic or ecological shocks (droughts, floods, cyclones, earthquakes,…) :
a rough proxy of the size of the shocks can be given by the instability of agricultural value
added; weighting this instability index by the ratio of agricultural value added to GDP allows
one to take into account the exposure of the economies to this kind of shock (Guillaumont and
Guillaumont, 1988). Another major kind of shock is constituted by trade shocks : here we
distinguish long term shocks, through the trend of the terms of trade, and short term shocks,
captured by the index of instability of the real value of exports (deflated by the unit value of
exports). Finally we use the logarithm of population, as a proxy for the structural exposure to
these two last kinds of shocks : large countries are indeed less vulnerable to trade shocks than
smaller ones. Note that instabilities are measured with respect to a linear trend value.
Moreover, as far as we are interested in a "good environment" indicator, we need to invert the
scale of the instability variables, so that they reflect "relative stabilities".
Finally, following Dollar and Burnside (1997) the policy variables used are the
inflation rate as a measure of monetary policy, the budget surplus, and the Sachs and Warner
(1995) trade openness variable. These variables are then normalised on a scale from 0 to 100
and combined in a policy indicator. They are weighted by their impact on economic growth,
as is shown in regression (2) in Table 1.
The two composite indicators of 1) environment / vulnerability and 2) macro-
economic policy, have been constructed respectively from the OLS regressions (1.1) and (1.2)17
of Table 1. We note that in each equation, all the variables intended to become the
components of the respective indicators are highly significant.18
OLS Growth regressions results
We can now turn to the OLS growth regressions including the aid to GDP ratio
(Ait) as an explanatory variable, and the aid interactive variables as well
8. The results are
given in Table 2.
The first regression (2.1) which corresponds to eq. 1 presented above in the
"empirical model" gives significant results for nearly all variables (only ethnolinguistic
fragmentation has a p value above 10%, actually 15%). In particular three variables  it it P ˆ , E ˆ ,
and Ait are highly significant: growth seems positively influenced by a good environment (low
vulnerability), good macro-economic policy, and a high level of aid. Moreover, and this is our
main concern, aid effectiveness is higher when vulnerability is high (i.e. lower when the
environment is good), as it was expected to be. But, contrary to Burnside-Dollar's findings,
the better the macro policy, the lower aid's effectiveness. We have presented above in section
2 some reasons why this could be the case : the weaker the initial quality of policy, the
stronger the improvement which can be brought by aid.
Of course, one should be cautious regarding the robustness of these results. We
note that, introduced separately, the two interactive variables are no longer significant
(regressions 2.2 and 2.3).
Aid and policy regressions
As noted above, it is likely that the aid and policy variables are endogenous.
Before proceeding to the estimation of the TSLS growth regression where aid and policy are
instrumented, it seems  interesting to consider independently the aid and the policy
regressions, corresponding to equations (2) and (3) of the model.
Aid regressions are given in Table 3. It appears significantly determined by the
structural variables traditionally used in aid allocation functions (initial GDP per capita, infant
mortality, population size). The variables assumed to represent "donors interests" in some
                                                       
8 We have not introduced the results with the interactive variable Human Capital x Aid as it appears in equation
(4) because this interactive variable was not significant. It was not significant in the TSLS growth regressions as
well.19
other studies here are not significant
9. Concerning our two composite indicators, it appears
that the environment / vulnerability indicator is highly significant
10: high vulnerability results
in more aid, as expected. But the policy indicator does not appear significant, contrary to the
results found by Burnside and Dollar: there would thus be room to improve aid allocation on
that side. This may due to the longer period of observation we have chosen, which prevents
one from capturing the short or medium term reactions of aid to policy changes.
Policy regressions are given in Table 4. Only two variables appear to be
significant (plus the negative dummy for the period 1970-1981 corresponding to the poor
policies of this period) : the level of human capital which seems to improve the quality of
policies, and the state of the external / climatic environment. Bad environment made it more
difficult to implement good policies (and so had a  negative effect on growth, not only
directly but also through policy). One aspect of the economic vulnerability to shocks is
precisely that shocks may result in worse policy.
TSLS growth results
Finally, we come to the results obtained for growth regressions with a two-stage
least square procedure. We first re-estimate (eq. 5.1) the full model corresponding to eq. 1, by
instrumenting the following variables:  it it P ˆ , E ˆ , Ait ,     Ait x it E ˆ ,   Ait x it P ˆ . Instruments are the
independent variables of the aid regression and the lagged values of the policy variables, plus
some multiplicative variables
11.
The results in this regression (5.1) are the same as those obtained using OLS
(Table 1, eq. 1.1), with one exception: the interactive variable Ait  it P ˆ , previously significantly
negative, is no longer significant, which makes these results less contrary with those of
Burnside-Dollar, but confirms the ambiguousness of the impact of policy on aid effectiveness.
                                                       
9 We introduced a dummy variable for Egypt but it did not change the results, either in the aid regressions or in
the growth TSLS regressions.
10 Note that, in this case, the environment / vulnerability indicator does not include the population variable. The
indicator then is the weighted sum of the trend of terms of trade and of the value added and real value of exports
instabilities.
11 The full list of the instruments is : lagged aid (1966-1969 for the first period and 1978-1981 for the second
period), the squared log of initial GDP and of initial population size, the initial infant mortality rate, the latter
squared, log population x infant mortality, variables likely to represent donors own interests, and the lagged
values of the inflation rate, the fiscal surplus and the openness dummy, (1966-1969; 1978-1981).20
Actually, the main point is that aid effectiveness is increasing with the vulnerability of the














 > 0  when Eit £ 6.46
It follows that according to this estimation more aid had a positive effect on
growth only when the environment was bad, i.e. only in vulnerable countries.
The results can also be interpreted in another way : they show that the negative
effects of a bad environment (high vulnerability) can be lessened by aid (for any likely level
of aid, since ¶g / ¶Êit = 0.066 - 0.13.Ait < 0 only if Ait > 50 %).
Three other regressions are presented in the Table 5 which allow one to compare
the two models of aid effectiveness (eq. 5.2 and 5.3 or 5.4). Significant results for the aid
effects are obtained with the “vulnerability model” but not with the “policy model”.
An important point concerning the TSLS regressions is the choice of good instruments for the
aid and policy variables. A way to check that the instruments are not correlated with the
growth residual is to perform an over-identification test
12 (Hausman, 1983). The results of this
test are given in the last rows of Table 5 and suggest that the instruments chosen are
appropriate and that the model is well-specified.
                                                       
12 The hypothesis tested is : H0 : g = aX + e versus g = aX + bZ + e where X are exogenous and endogenous
variables and Z are the instruments. We test whether b = 0 (i.e. the instruments and specification of the model
are appropriate). We cannot reject H0 if the calculated chi squared is less than the critical value of chi squared
statistics.21
4 – Implications: a performance-based aid allocation
We now draw the implications of the previous analysis for aid allocation. We
suggest that previous results are consistent with an allocation based on performance, then
suggest some precisions in the meaning and measurement of performances.
The rationale for an allocation according performances
It has been previously suggested that aid allocation should be conditioned by
performance (Collier, Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney and Gunning 1997). This
proposal took place in the debate about conditionality reform and as such primarily concerned
program or adjustment aid. Its purpose was to avoid the shortcomings of a conditionality
relying on the instruments of economic policy and leading to a weak internalization or
ownership of the reform process, then to superficial and reversible reforms. Thus a
performance conditionality was proposed as an alternative to the present instrument
conditionality. We note that beyond aid for adjustment this proposal may concern by a more
or less indicative way the global amount of aid to be allocated to a country.
Our point is now that a general principle of aid allocation according to
performance is consistent with the empirical findings of this paper. We provisionaly define
economic performance as the economic outcome (here we focus on growth, but it can also be
poverty reduction) not resulting from exogeneous factors (initial conditions and external
environment), i.e. economic outcomes adjusted for the impact of these factors. So economic
performance is expected to reveal the effectiveness of policy, irrespective of the instruments
used. It is somewhat a difference between gross results and the impact of structural and
environmental factors. 
First, what have we found about policy which is relevant for our purpose ? Aid
effectiveness does not significantly depends on the quality of policy –as could be expected
from theoretical assumptions-,  but policy  -at least some identified macro policy variables- is
independently a significant factor of growth. Moreover policy does not seem to have been
significantly influenced by aid. So if policy, whatever the instruments are, can be improved
through a new aid allocation process, grounded on performance, this new aid allocation
criterion can lead to a higher aid effectiveness.22
Second and presumably main finding, aid effectiveness depends on external
environment. All other things equal, aid is more effective in more vulnerable countries. So an
aid allocation which takes into account shocks faced by the countries and gives additional aid
to those more vulnerable countries is likely to increase aid effectiveness.
Thus aid allocation according performance may conciliate the two aims of aid we
opposed above, supporting policy and facing vulnerability, because performance is adjusted
for vulnerability and reveals policy (a given observed rate of growth means a higher
performance when the country faced an unfavorable environment). But the two implicit aid
criteria behind the idea of performance do not play the same role. If aid has to be allocated
according to (revealed) policy, it is not because it is more productive when policy is good, but
because it will give an incentive to improve policy (whatever the instruments are). If aid is to
be allocated according to structural vulnerability, it is because it is expected to be more
conducive to growth. Note then that it is also a compensation for the negative impact of
vulnerability on growth (we can assume no moral hazard, since the compensation will be
limited to a small fraction of the vulnerability impact).
We can summarize the argument using the equation (4) and knowing that b'ah @ 0.







 = b’a + b’ae . E
~
it    (b’a > 0,  b’ae < 0) (5)
So there are two main ways to increase aid effectiveness:
- to improve the quality of aid (in order to increase b'a),
- to allocate aid according to performance, which means both:
. increasing the reaction of policy to aid (which would involve pa in equation (2)
becoming significantly positive, and subsequently an increase of b’a )
. giving more aid when E
~
it is low (b'ae < 0), i.e. to vulnerable countries.
Measurement of performances
If performance may be a logical criterion of aid allocation, we need to know
precisely how it can be measured. There are indeed several possible measures of
performances. What we need is a comparative measure of performance, allowing to rank the
countries. We propose to define a (growth) performance indicator of a country i comparable23
to that of other countries as its rate of growth adjusted for the effect that exogenous factors
(initial conditions, trade or climatic environment) have on it both directly and through their
influence on policy. This definition will be compared with two other proximate methods of
performance measurement. Then performance of some particular countries will be considered
with regard to the actual level of aid they receive.
To link the measurement method with our previous conceptual framework, let us
come back to eq (1) and combine it with eq (3) in order to eliminate aid from the growth
equation, intended to be used as an aid criterion. Since aid is a function of exogeneous factors
(initial conditions and external environment factors) and of policy, we obtain a reduced form
of growth equation where growth only depends on these exogeneous factors i.e. the Xit and Eit
vectors (including now all the factors influencing either growth or aid) and on policy factors
(the Pit vector).  Since we have no longer variables interactive with aid, we have no reason to
now consider differently the initial conditions (Xit), such as human capital, and the external
environment/vulnerability variable (Eit)  (the impact of which on aid effectiveness is likely to
differ). So, assuming all structural, initial, environment variables are included in Eit, we obtain
13, another reduced equation:
git = b'o + b'e Eit + b'p Pit + eit (6)
Note that here b'e = be  + ba . ae < be and b'p = bp  + ba . ap > bp
A first way to define performance of country i is to adjust its observed rate of
growth git  for the fact that exogeneous (including initial and external environment) factors in
this country differ from the average of the other developing countries (let call  t E  this average
during period t). According to this method, used by Collier, Guillaumont, Guillaumont
Jeanneney and Gunning 1997, we measure a performance (I) as
g
I
it = git - b'e (Eit -  t E ) = b'o + b'e  t E  + b’p Pit  + e’it  (7)
Performance I indicates what would have been the rate of growth of country i if
its structural characteristics and environment had been the same as the average of other
                                                       
13 For simplicity we delete the interactive term Eit x Pit as well as the squared values of Eit and Pit which only
change the functional form of the model but not the line of reasoning.24
countries. Different performances between countries in time t result from the impact of
different level of policy variables, and from those not identified factors captured by the
residual.
But, as we have seen, policy is itself partially the result of these exogeneous
factors represented in the vector Eit . Actually it appeared to significantly depend on human
capital and vulnerability. So we can substitute in eq (6)  Pit  by its value such as determined by
eq (2) –assuming again pa = 0  and obtain a new reduced growth equation:
git = b''o + b''e Eit + e''it (8)
    = (b'o + b'p po) + (b'e + b'p pe) Eit + e''it (8bis)
In this equation b''e captures both the direct effect of the variables  Eit  and their normal effect
through policy. It results in another and here preferred definition of performance, let us say
performance II. It is the rate of growth a country i would have achieved with environment




it = git - b''e (Eit -  t E )
      = b''o + b''e  t E  + e''it (9)
So with performance II the differences between countries in period t are given by the residual
of a growth equation including as explanatory variables only factors likely to be independent
from policy. It is the growth rate adjusted for the total effect of “exogeneous” factors (either
initial or related to the environment) (see a previous presentation of a similar concept
performance and the problems it raises in Guillaumont and Guillaumont 1988, Guillaumont,
Guillaumont and Plane 1988, Guillaumont 1994).
The difference between Performance I and Performance II appears to result from
the treatment of the indirect impact of the environment variables, i.e. their impact through
policy, taken into account in Performance II but not in Performance I. In other words,
performance I does not take into account the fact that a good policy is made more difficult by





it = - (b'e - b''e ) (Eit -  t E ) (10)
              = (b'o - b''o ) + (b'e - b''e )  t E  + b'p Pit + e'it -  e"it (10bis)
So the quality of the assessment of Performance II depends only on the
identification of all the factors independent from policy. That of performance I depends on the
same and on the identification of policy factors.
We can also compare these two concepts of performance with the index of
economic policy used by Burnside and Dollar. Indeed, this index has not been built precisely
to assess performance, but rather to avoid the juxtaposition of several interactive variables
with aid corresponding to the different components of policy.  However it may be considered
as an indicator of performance, itself adjusted for the impact of environment factors. Keeping
our notations, it can be defined as 
14
git
III = b'o + b'e  t E  + b'p  Pit
       = git -b'e (Eit -  t E ) - e'it  (11)
As noted by the authors it can be interpreted as a country's predicted growth rate, given its
budget, inflation and trade policies (here Pt) , assuming that environment variables had the
mean values of other countries 
15.
The difference between this macro policy indicator with the two previous
concepts of performance is as follows :
- it differs from Performance I in that the residual of the growth regression e'it, which captures
the effects of all the policy instruments others than the three macro policy indicators listed




- it differs even more from Performance II, since moreover it does not take into account the
indirect impact of environment through policy. In Performance II policy indicators do no





III) -  (git
I – git
II) = (b'e - b"e) (Eit -  t E ) +  e'it
                                                       
14 we don't indicate here for simplicity the time period dummies.
15 They add "since the time dummies have been excluded it is the predicted growth rate in the world economic
conditions of 1990-1993 (the bench mark period)"26
                = (b"o - b'o) +  (b"e - b'e)  t E  - b'p Pit + eit" (12)
Considering that the two first terms of the last equation are constant in period t, the difference
between the measures of Performance II and III comes from the difference between the
residual of the eq. (8) supposed to capture all the effects of policy choices, and the estimation
of the direct impact of the policy variable of eq. (6).
This presentation of the three methods of performance (or policy) measurement is
of course over simplified. In particular a special attention should be given to the treatment of
aid in the three cases, which, as noted, is determined by both the environment and the policy
factors. In order to assess performance after taking into account the amount of aid received,
which may be the point of view of donors, we can modify the three previous, and consider aid
as a specific exogeneous factor. So coming back to the eq. (1), with interactive variables (aid
x environment and possibly aid x policy), it means that performance is then assessed with
regard to a normal or average aid effectiveness.
Anyway these simplified measures of growth performance can serve to illustrate
the difficulty and implications of the methodological choices in that matter of performance
assessment.
Conclusion
Aid effects are a complex matter. And selectivity in aid allocation is a difficult
task, not without a risk. The risk is to design selectivity from a fragile assessment of aid
effects.
Here we endorse the idea that aid effects on growth are not necessarily positive
and that they depend on specific conditions in each recipient country. We find that the effects
are all the more positive a country faces a bad environment : aid seems to have accelerated
growth only in the more vulnerable countries. In other words, it has significantly dampened
the negative effects of a bad environment. But we do not find that aid effectiveness (in growth
terms) has been increased by a better policy. Of course a better policy is an important factor
of growth, but the impact of which, it seems, is not increased by aid. Simultaneously we find27
that aid allocation has been influenced by the environment (aid reacts positively to the
vulnerability), but not by policy
16.
If our results are robust, it does not follow that policy improvement is not to be
encouraged by aid. It is rather the opposite, as far it has not been enough the case. But it can
be looked for and may be obtained even if aid effectiveness does not depend on policy.
Defining growth performances as that part of growth which is not explained by
exogeneous factors (initial structures, external or climatic environment), we suggest that a
performance based aid allocation may together increase the aid effectiveness and incent
developing countries to promote better policies by their own. It means that countries will
receive more aid when they face a difficult environment and when they implement policies
leading to better performances, whatever the chosen instruments.
Now caveats are needed. Cross-sectional econometric tests of assumed
relationships between aid, vulnerability, policies and growth are to be considered with caution
and are always open to debate. The policy implications of the topic makes the debate (with
similar data) all the more needed. In the case of the present study, the results of which
significantly differ of some previous ones, we need to test their sensitivity to the definition of
aid, to the length of the observations period, to the size and the composition of the sample
(unfortunatly limited, as in other studies, by a lack of data).
                                                       
16 Policy itself is positively influenced by the environment, and by human capital.28
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Press.Table 1 - Initial growth regressions, without aid, used for 
the weighting of environment and policy indicators
Regression No 1.1 1.2
dependent variable Per capita GDP growth Per capita GDP growth





Log of initial GDP per capita -1,46 -0,3
(0,0005) (0,41)
Av. years of sec. schooling (initial) 2,66 -0,16
(0,006) (0,79)
Rate of population growth -0,69 -0,7
(0,049) (0,076)
Financial depth (M2/GDP) (lagged) 0,035 0,021
(0,081) (0,38)
Political instability (lagged) -3,77 -0,36
(0,012) (0,79)
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation -1,01 -0,608
(0,26) (0,509)
Environment or vulnerability variables (Eit) 
Stability of agricultural value added 0,032
(0,017)
Stability of real value of exports 0,02
(0,0048)
Trend of terms of trade 0,032
(0,0003)
Log of initial population 0,05
(0,0011)








Adjusted R2 0,5 0,47
White-heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
P-values in parenthesesRegression No 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
Dependent variable Per capita Per capita Per capita Per capita
GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth
Structural or initial variables (Xit)
constant -0,21 2,55 -0,79 5,80
(0,95) (0,53) (0,844) (0,15)
dummy70 3,89 3,64 3,92 1,57
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0,0036)
Log of initial GDP per capita -1,25 -1,406 -1,04 -1,86
(0,0027) (0,0009) (0,0073) (0,00)
Av. years of sec. schooling (initial) 1,42 1,52 1,36 2,66
(0,0788) (0,065) (0,1065) (0,0027)
Rate of population growth -0,79 -0,8806 -0,866 -0,66
(0,0093) (0,0066) (0,0078) (0,047)
Financial depth (M2/GDP) (lagged) 0,0323 0,0336 0,026 0,043
(0,0722) (0,0771) (0,207) (0,027)
Political instability (lagged) -3,406 -3,154 -3,6 -3,28
(0,0081) (0,0146) (0,0041) (0,036)
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation -1,055 -1,036 -1,0035 -1,109
(0,15) (0,174) (0,18) (0,211)
Environment or low vulnerability indicator (Eit) 0,81 0,74 0,71 1,0707
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0,00)
Policy indicator (Pit) 0,92 0,75 0,92
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Official Development Assistance (Ait) 0,38 0,14 0,092 0,303
(0,0143) (0,13) (0,23) (0,0029)
Ait x Eit -0,039 -0,024 -0,05
(0,0503) (0,168) (0,0042)
Ait x Pit -0,026 -0,017
(0,027) (0,12)
observations 85 85 85 95
Adjusted R2 0,67 0,66 0,66 0,53
White-heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
P-values in parentheses
Table 2 - OLS growth regressionsRegression No 3.1 3.2







Log of initial GDP per capita -3,56 -3,89
(0,0008) (0,0003)
Infant Mortality 0,0404 0,032
(0,0402) (0,0779)
Log of initial population -0,167 -0,187
(0,0001) (0,0002)
Donors' interests
Central America -0,29 -0,709
(0,80) (0,6005)
Franc Zone 0,48 -0,627
(0,75) (0,797)
Sub-Saharan Africa -1,29 -1,946
(0,4) (0,182)
Environment or low vulnerability (Eit) -1,56 -1,018
(0,013) (0,023)
Policy indicator (Pit) 0,021 -0,327
(0,96) (0,441)
Over-id. test : calculated chi squared 3,68
chi squared statistics 5,99
observations 105 80
Adjusted R2 0,57 0,56
White-heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
P-values in parentheses
Table 3 - Aid regressions Regression No 4.1 4.3
Dependent variable Policy indicator Policy indicator
OLS TSLS





Log of initial GDP per capita -0,29 -0,21
(0,41) (0,56)
Av. years of sec. schooling (initial) 1,67 1,63
(0,0031) (0,0043)
Rate of population growth 0,36 0,3
(0,17) (0,28)
Financial depth (M2/GDP) (lagged) 0,012 0,0075
(0,507) (0,69)
Political instability (lagged) -1,05 -1,2
(0,45) (0,41)
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation 0,11 0,25
(0,85) (0,68)
Environment or low vulnerability indicator (Eit) 0,32 0,35
(0,0609) (0,097)
Official Development Assistance (Ait) -0,0046 0,0049
(0,92) (0,93)
Over-id. test : calculated chi squared 14,62
chi squared statistics 15,5
observations 87 86
Adjusted R2 0,48 0,49
White-heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
P-values in parentheses
Table 4 - Policy regressionsRegression No 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5
Dependent variable Per capita Per capita Per capita Per capita Per capita
GDP growth  GDP growth  GDP growth  GDP growth  GDP growth 
Structural or initial variables (Xit)
constant 9,42 12,03 2,305 7,21 2,51
(0,18) (0,082) (0,7) (0,1162) (0,39)
dummy70 3,91 3,8 4,25 1,59 4,42
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,0028) (0,00)
Log of initial GDP per capita -2,21 -2,41 -1,16 -2,11 -1,13
(0,0053) (0,0024) (0,0307) (0,00) (0,001)
Av. years of sec. schooling (initial) 0,89 0,88 0,84 2,65 0,61
(0,25) (0,26) (0,32) (0,002) (0,47)
Rate of population growth -0,81 -0,87 -0,92 -0,65 -1,23
(0,0053) (0,0042) (0,0004) (0,048) (0,0003)
Financial depth (M2/GDP) (lagged) 0,062 0,067 0,026 0,048 0,027
(0,019) (0,0104) (0,25) (0,0167) (0,25)
Political instability (lagged) -2,56 -2,14 -3,84 -2,97 -3,026
(0,17) (0,24) (0,0095) (0,078) (0,0228)
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation -2,07 -2,18 -1,38 -1,17 -1,55
(0,039) (0,038) (0,0971) (0,18) (0,049)
Environment or low vulnerability 0,066 0,61 0,46 1,13 0,52
indicator (Eit) (0,0021) (0,0053) (0,0304) (0,00) (0,001)
Policy indicator (Pit) 0,94 0,85 1,103 1,022
(0,0001) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00)
Official Development Assistance (Ait) 0,84 0,76 0,12 0,51
(0,065) (0,11) (0,53) (0,08)
Ait x Eit -0,13 -0,14 -0,08
(0,059) (0,0748) (0,052)
-0,018 -0,036
Ait x Pit (0,56) (0,28)
Over-id. test : calculated chi squared 1,577 1,95 11,51 7,26 0,061
chi squared statistics 15,5 16,9 16,9 14,06 5,99
observations 68 68 68 95 68
Adjusted R2 0,63 0,58 0,71 0,52 0,71
White-heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
P-values in parentheses
Table 5 - TSLS growth regressionsBenin Algeria
Burkina Faso Egypt, Arab Rep.
Cameroon Iran, Islamic Rep.
Central African Republic Jordan
Congo Morocco
































Countries included in the data set